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I. INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA or the "Act") litigation
presents a standing paradox. In the current posture, it appears that states lack
standing to challenge the federal law on behalf of individuals, while individuals
possess standing to challenge the federal law on behalf of states. This Article
contends that there is no principled reason for this asymmetry and argues that
standing doctrine should apply as liberally to states as to individuals, assuming states
allege the constitutional minimum requirements for standing and especially where
the legal challenge turns on the allocation of power between the federal government
and the states. While states may have no greater claim to judicial review of federal
laws than individuals, they should not have any less.'
A. PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THE ACA LITIGATION
The Supreme Court will not have to reach this particular procedural conundrum
to decide the merits of the Florida lawsuit on which it granted certiorari2 because the
particular constellation of plaintiffs before the Court covers all fronts. The two
substantive claims are, first, whether the ACA's minimum essential coverage
requirement, popularly known as the individual mandate, exceeds Congress's
t Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. Special thanks to Abigail Moncrieff
for both hosting the Symposium and providing valuable suggestions for improving this Article. Earlier
drafts also benefited immeasurably from comments by Dan Coenen, Brendan Maher, Lou Mulligan,
Jack Preis, Neil Siegel, and Mike Wells.
This contention is both broader and less qualified than previous commentators' suggestions.
See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Federalism and the Challenges of State Constitutional
Contestation, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 983, 1005 (2011) (expressing concern with judicial decisions
granting states "a special pass into court" or granting "special solicitude" to state standing, and
concluding, "[p]erhaps states deserve no less judicial protection than other parties, but they do not
seem to need more"); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387,
519 (1995) (limiting state standing to challenge federal legislation to situations in which states'
interests are primarily threatened and denying state standing "when individuals are the more
immediate objects of such regulation").
2 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.); Dep't of Health &
Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012);
Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar.
28, 2012).
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enumerated commerce or spending powers, 3 and, second, whether the ACA's
expansion of Medicaid eligibility to low-income, non-elderly adults exceeds
previously articulated limits on Congress's conditional spending power to encourage
state cooperation in implementing federal programs.4 Plaintiffs in the Florida lawsuit
include two small business owners, the National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB), and twenty-six states. The individual business owners allege that the
ACA's minimum essential coverage requirement has already caused them injury-in-
fact 6 by compelling them to alter their business and financial practices in
anticipation of the individual mandate's 2014 effective date. 7 Even if one or both of
the individual plaintiffs falls out of the lawsuit, 8 the NFIB would likely maintain
standing to represent the interests of its individual members.9 Alternatively, there are
many other similarly affected individuals and small business owners who could join
the suit, alleging personal injury.10
The states challenge both the individual mandate and Medicaid expansion.
States clearly have standing on the Medicaid claim as that issue alleges federal
coercion or commandeering of states and state officials in violation of the Tenth
Amendment." Medicaid expansion operates directly on states, imposing new federal
requirements on the states themselves.' 2 States' standing to challenge the individual
mandate is murkier, however. The individual mandate, by its terms, applies to
3Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604; see 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a)-(b) (West 2012)
(requiring that all "applicable individuals" (1) shall maintain "minimum essential coverage" for
themselves and their dependents, or (2) pay a monetary penalty).
4 Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West 2012) (extending
Medicaid eligibility to adults under age sixty-five, who are not pregnant and not already covered, with
incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987)
(listing limits on conditional spending power).
5 Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (1 1th Cir.
2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 603, and cert. granted sub nor.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604, and cert. granted in part sub nom., Florida, 132 S.
Ct. 604.
6 U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 (limiting federal courts' jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies");
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (listing three requirements for standing,
including "injury in fact").
' Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1270-71 (N.D.
Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 648 F.3d 1235
(11 th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011)
(mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and
cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).
8 Jess Bravin & Vanessa O'Connell, Business Owner's Bankruptcy Disclosed to Supreme Court,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204879004
577108951415171134.html (discussing changed circumstances of one plaintiff, which might impact
her standing to bring a challenge to the individual mandate).
9 See Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977) (regarding
requirements of association standing).
1o See Orders in Pending Cases, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 603, Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604, Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders%5C0 11712zor.pdf (granting NFIB's motion to add
additional individual petitioners and respondents to the litigation); Jess Bravin & Emily Maltby,
Health-Law Opponents Try to Add Plaintiffs to Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970204331304577141072540030502.html.
1 See Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 21-22, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (No. 11 -
400) (U.S. Jan. 10, 2012), 2012 WL 105551, available at http://aca-litigation.wikispaces.com/
file/view/States+brief+as+petitioner+%28Medicaid%29.pdf (summary of argument).
12 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (regarding disposal of radioactive
waste); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (involving minimum drinking age).
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individuals, not states.1 3 It is enacted under federal law, carries a federal tax penalty
for non-compliance, and will be enforced by federal authorities. 14 States have
offered various theories of standing to challenge the individual mandate, but the
Court likely will not have to resolve that question. 15 As long as one individual
plaintiff or the association representing individuals in the Florida case retains
standing, the question of the constitutionality of the individual mandate is properly
before the Court.
16
Lower courts' decisions in the ACA litigation, however, leave the standing
paradox unresolved. At least one court wrote strongly that a state, suing alone, may
not challenge the individual mandate. 7 That decision may be the product of strategic
error by the plaintiff-state or the court's restrictive application of standing doctrine.
By contrast, lower court decisions, described in detail below, liberally allowed
individuals to challenge the individual mandate's constitutionality-not as a
violation of their own individual rights but as an intrusion on states' reserved
powers-as long as the plaintiffs alleged concrete, particularized injury.'8 After
cataloguing courts' treatment of individual plaintiffs' standing claims, this Article
contends that courts should similarly allow states to challenge the scope of federal
power, as long as states meet the same constitutional requirements for standing.
B. STANDING DOCTRINE
The essential contours of federal standing law are well established and not at
issue in the ACA litigation. Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal judicial
power to the adjudication of cases or controversies. 19 The case-or-controversy
requirement means that the plaintiff must have standing to bring a challenge. 2' The
"irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" consists of three elements:
13 One statutory role for states with respect to the individual mandate is tied to health insurance
exchanges, which are required to certify individuals as exempt from the individual mandate. Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(d)(4), 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Accordingly, if states elect to
operate their own exchanges, rather than leaving that task to the federal government, they would be
required to perform that certification function.
14 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c) (West 2012) (providing federal income tax penalty); id. § 5000A(g)
(specifying federal enforcement).
15 See Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11 th
Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011)
(mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and
cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012) (noting that
"the question of the state plaintiffs' standing to challenge the individual mandate is an interesting and
difficult one, in the posture of this case, it is purely academic and one we need not confront today").
16 Id. (noting that "[t]he law is abundantly clear that so long as at least one plaintiff has standing
to raise each claim-as is the case here-we need not address whether the remaining plaintiffs have
standing" and citing cases); see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.,
547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) (noting that only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit the
Court to consider the petition for review).
17 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert.
filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420).
"S See infra Part III (summarizing lower court decisions).
'9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-96 (1968).20 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004).
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First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, ... and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical'.... Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to
be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not
before the court." . . . Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely
"speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable
decision."
2
'
A plaintiff may allege either actual present injury or imminent future injury.22 With
respect to associations, the Supreme Court held that
an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members
when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit.
23
The Court has interpreted the "concrete and particularized" injury requirement
to mean that generalized grievances about the government, "claiming only harm to
[the plaintiffs] and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution
and laws," do not support Article III standing.24 "While it does not matter how many
persons have been injured by the challenged action, the party bringing suit must
show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way., 25 The fact that an
injury may be widely shared, or that a political forum may also be available to raise
the issue, does not lessen the injury or necessarily deprive the court ofjurisdiction2 6
The constitutional requirements for standing "preserve[] the vitality of the
adversarial process" by assuring that the parties before the Court have a real stake in
the outcome and that the issues will be resolved "not in the rarified atmosphere of a
debating society, but in a concrete, factual context."2 7 "More important, the law of
Article III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of
powers., 2 8 The separation of powers doctrine limits the role of courts, committing
certain subject matter to Congress and the political process. 29 "In significant part, a
21 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
22 Id. at 560.
23 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
24 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74.
25 Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
26 See FEC v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491
U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989).
27 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
2' Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); see generally Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983)
(explaining that standing is an integral part of the separation of powers doctrine).
29 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) ("Lack of standing within the
narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the political
forum or at the polls. Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional electoral process
may be thought at times, our system provides for changing members of the political branches when
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debate over what constitutes 'injury in fact' sufficient for Article III is thus a debate
about separation of powers and the respective responsibilities of Congress and the
Court."' 30 Justiciability limits, including standing, also "empower the executive
branch to promote its policies, constrained by political, rather than judicial limits." 31
By channeling only disputes that satisfy the constitutional minimum requirements,
the standing doctrine respects "the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts
in a democratic society.,
32
II. INDIVIDUAL AND STATE CHALLENGES TO THE ACA
In the ACA litigation, both states and individuals are suing the federal
government or representatives in their official capacity, challenging the
constitutionality of ACA. Typically, constitutional litigation involves individuals or
private entities suing government defendants. Until relatively recently, states rarely
sued the federal government to vindicate their own or their citizens' rights. 33
Conflicts over the relative power of states and the federal government were resolved
through the political, not judicial, process. 34 These structural issues might end up in
court if individuals seek to defend themselves from federal enforcement actions by
challenging the applicable law as exceeding Congress's enumerated powers.35 In the
ACA litigation, the individual claims arise in just that posture. States also challenge
certain ACA provisions, however, defending the contours of state power under the
Constitution and, perhaps derivatively, the rights of individual state inhabitants.
dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives
are delinquent in performing duties committed to them.").
30 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 233 (1988).
31 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 (noting that separation of powers principle "counsels against
recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works
a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to
fulfill its legal duties. The Constitution, after all, assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the
Judicial Branch, the duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. . . .' We could not
recognize respondents' standing in this case without running afoul of that structural principle.")
(internal citation omitted); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 985 (citing sources).
32 See Allen, 486 U.S. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
33 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) ("Well before the creation
of the modem administrative state, we recognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes
of invoking federal jurisdiction."); see also Schapiro, supra note 1, at 986; Woolhandler & Collins,
supra note 1, at 390.
34 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (noting
"effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests"); Herbert Wechsler,
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of
the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954) ("[T]he national political process in
the United States-and especially the role of the states in the composition and selection of the central
government-is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on
the domain of the states."); see also Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Powers Vis-6-Vis the
States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1557 (1977) (arguing that the
national political system protects states' interests in Congress and that the federal courts should focus
on individual rights); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 983 (noting that "states may actively oppose national
policy" through political means).
35 Schapiro, supra note 1, at 988; Woolhander & Collins, supra note 1, at 439-40; see supra note
34 (listing examples).
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A. INDIVIDUALS LITIGATING STATES' INTERESTS
Private parties suing over the ACA include individuals, subject to the minimum
essential coverage requirement, 36 or employers, subject to the employer
responsibility provisions. 37 In both cases, the plaintiffs challenge the federal
government's enforcement of tax penalties on them for failing to comply with the
applicable provisions. Lacking cognizable due process, equal protection, or other
individual right claims, 38 the lawsuits assert that the ACA is an unconstitutional
exercise of congressional power and, therefore, the Act, or at least the challenged
provisions, cannot be applied against them.
To be sure, there are plausible individual rights objections to the requirement to
purchase health insurance, including interference with autonomous healthcare
decision-making and freedom of contract. At the core, the objections sound in
libertarian rights and economic liberty to be free from government coercion.
Opponents contend that the federal government cannot require individuals to
purchase a good or service from another private individual or company. Arguments
asserting rights to bodily autonomy or freedom to make healthcare decisions are
unavailing because the mandate does not require individuals to receive any
particular medical treatment, or, indeed, any treatment at all. Nor does it require
individuals to seek medical care under the health insurance policies that they
purchase; it merely requires the purchase of health insurance.3 9
Individual rights claims, while politically salient and arguably sympathetic,
likely would not support the plaintiffs' arguments to strike down the individual
mandate as unconstitutional. In the Court's post-Lochner era,40 economic liberties do
not receive robust protection, and government intrusions on them are subject only to
low-level judicial scrutiny. 41 The individual mandate likely would survive such
scrutiny.4 2 The congressional record amply demonstrates various flaws in healthcare
36 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2012).
37 d. § 4980H.
38 See Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, 37 J.L.
MED. & ETHICs 40, 44-47 (2009) (considering individual rights claims); Abigail R. Moncrieff,
Safeguarding the Safeguards. The ACA Litigation and the Extension of Structural Protection to Non-
Fundamental Liberties, 64 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4-5), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid = 1919272 (explaining "that, in most scholars'
view, the individual mandate simply does not infringe liberty-at least not in any constitutionally
meaningful way" and considering and dismissing various other arguments).
39 In fact, the risk-pooling objective of the individual mandate is served all the better if
individuals purchase, but do not use, health insurance. The individual mandate aims to redistribute the
cost of insurance among high-risk and low-risk individuals by requiring everyone to purchase a
policy. Premiums paid by low-risk individuals who purchase insurance but do not use their coverage
will subsidize high-risk individuals whose medical costs exceed their premium contributions.
4Q Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300
U.S. 379, 391 (1937) ("What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of
contract.").
41 See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Defense of the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 62
MERCER L. REV. 618, 618 (2011) ("The Supreme Court has made it clear in terms of due process that
the government can regulate the economy so long as it has a rational basis for doing so."); Richard E.
Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Towards a Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C.
L. REV. 329, 344-45 (1995) (noting that since 1937, the Court routinely applies "the deferential
rational basis test" to economic liberty claims and that "[u]nder this test, the government need only
show that a measure is reasonably related to some conceivable legitimate purpose").
42 See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for cert.
filed, (U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11-117) (reasoning that Congress had a rational basis for the
individual mandate).
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markets and adverse selection problems presented if Congress does not couple the
ACA's popular provisions banning pre-existing condition exclusions 43 and
guaranteeing issuance 4 and renewability 45 of policies with a mandate to purchase
insurance before individuals become ill. 46 With individual rights claims unavailing,
opponents of the mandate instead assert structural arguments regarding the scope of
federal enumerated powers as compared to states' reserved powers.
But it is not immediately apparent what interest private individuals and entities
have in maintaining the federalist structure of government. One way of framing their
interest is that the very purpose of diffusing power between a central government
and separate sovereign states is to protect individual rights; hence, structural issues
necessarily are individual rights issues. Affirming that view of federalism, a recent
Supreme Court decision in Bond v. United States47 recognized an individual's
standing to challenge enforcement of a federal statute, not on the basis of a particular
federal enumerated power, but squarely on states' Tenth Amendment reserved
powers. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted "an individual has a direct
interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance between the
National Government and the States when the enforcement of those laws causes
injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable. Fidelity to principles of
federalism is not for the States alone to vindicate. 4 8 Although involving a very
different statute and very different sort of injury, Bond does establish precedent for
individuals to bring constitutional claims based on states' rights, effectively
invigorating the Tenth Amendment as an individually cognizable claim.49
Another way of thinking about individual plaintiffs' interests in vindicating
states' rights is the potential for state recognition of broader individual liberties than
federal law. The U.S. Constitution establishes a floor, requiring states to recognize at
least that level of individual rights, but states may exceed the federal floor and
accord even greater protection.50 For example, even though the Federal Constitution,
" 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-3 (West 2012).
44 Id. § 300gg-l(a).
41 Id. § 300gg-2(b).
46 Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1244-48
(11 th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011)
(mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and
cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012)
(summarizing congressional findings regarding healthcare and health insurance systems); Thomas
More, 651 F.3d at 544-45 (citing congressional record and other sources).
17 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2358 (2011) (challenging conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 229, which forbids
knowing possession or use, for nonpeaceful purposes, of a chemical that "can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans").
48 Id. at 2364.
49 See Garrett Epps, U.S. v. Bond: Reexamining the Mysterious l0th Amendment, THE ATLANTIC
(Feb. 18, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://www.theatlantic.con/national/archive/2011/02/us-v-bond-
reexamining-the-mysterious-10th-amendment/71436/ (suggesting that the case offers "oblique hints
about how the Justices are thinking about the pending health-care challenge"); Frank Minter, Did the
Supreme Court Tip Its Hand on ObamaCare?, AM. THINKER (June 23, 2011),
http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/06/did-the supremecourttip itshandon obamacare.html
(quoting Justice Kennedy's question during the Bond argument and suggesting it foreshadows "how
he might rule on ObamaCare"). But see Adam Liptak, Court Weighs the Power of Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/us/politics/23scotus.html (suggesting that
unique facts of Bond "offer[s] only limited guidance on the health care law's prospects").
50 See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "'Converse 1983" in Context, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1229, 1244 (2004) ("[T]he federal Constitution ... establishes a minimum baseline-a floor-
that state judges must respect on penalty of reversal. But the floor need not become a ceiling.").
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post-Lochner, does not robustly protect economic liberties, state law could.
Accordingly, states might enact statutes or constitutional amendments shielding their
own residents from a requirement to purchase health insurance, as long as federal
law did not provide otherwise. 51 That suggestion sounds in the new federalism
scholarship,52 which "share[s] the ultimate goal of creating in every state a vigorous,
independent body of state constitutional law." 53 More broadly, new federalism
advocates reinvigorating states' rights and shifting the balance of power back to state
governments through judicial and legislative channels. 54 In this view, private
plaintiffs' structural challenges to the individual mandate may derive from an
interest in defending or reinvigorating economic liberties under state law.
Allowing individuals to raise structural challenges as defenses to enforcement of
federal laws is not novel to the ACA context. 55 But the strategy has the dramatic
effect of elevating individual rights claims from easily overcome rational-relation
scrutiny to effectively no scrutiny at all. 56 If a federal law exceeds enumerated
51 Timothy S. Jost, Can the States Nullify Health Reform?, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 869, 870
(2010) (describing "first-generation" nullification statutes and amendments, which were not aimed at
actual federal legislation); see infra notes 94-95 (describing Virginia's and other states' Health Care
Freedom Acts). Before ACA, such laws would not be preempted and could have been intended to
block state legislators from enacting a state-level individual health insurance mandate, such as
Massachusetts did in 2006. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. II IM, § 2 (2010) ("Duty for certain adults to
obtain and maintain creditable coverage.").
52 See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of Slate Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761,
771 (1991).
53 Id.; see also Paul W. Kahn, Commentary, Interpretation and Authority in State
Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1147, 1159 (1993) (noting that state constitutionalism
should be free from that of the federal government); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering
the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 390-91 (1980) (noting the tendency for state law
arguments to be undermined).
54 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1052-54 (2001); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L.
REV. 7, 7-8 (2001); Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of
the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L .J 177, 177 (2005) ("As part of [the new
federalism] revolution, the Court has greatly restricted the ability of Congress to pass laws regulating
the conduct of the states under its enforcement powers granted in Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment .. "); Jeffrey A. Modisett, Discovering the Impact of the "New Federalism" on State
Policy Makers: A State Attorney General's Perspective, 32 IND. L. REV. 141, 141 (1998).
55 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Commerce Clause challenge to Federal
Controlled Substances Act raised by users and growers of marijuana); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (Commerce Clause challenge to Federal Violence Against Women Act raised by rape
defendants); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Commerce Clause challenge to Federal
Gun-Free School Zones Act brought by criminal defendant); see also, e.g., Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (alien sought review of deportation order,
challenging Federal Immigration and Nationality Act on separation of powers grounds); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (fruit grower challenged Arizona intrastate packing and processing
requirement on dormant Commerce Clause grounds); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)
(hearing father's suit to enjoin enforcement of federal child labor law as violating 10th Amendment),
overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418,
426-27, 432 (1871) (invalidating state sales tax on Commerce Clause grounds on individual's
challenge).56 See Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual Mandate, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1723,
1746 (2011) (discussing effect of allowing structural federalism challenge to individual mandate
would "categorically preclude" Congress from taking certain actions intruding on individual liberty,
whereas individual liberty claim would allow Congress to justify the intrusion with "compelling
government interests").
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powers, Congress may not enact it, no matter how good its reasons.57 By contrast, a
substantive due process, individual rights challenge would at least allow Congress to
justify its reasons for infringing on otherwise constitutionally protected rights. In
effect, individuals would become independent citizen-enforcers of structural limits
of the Constitution, overriding legislative policy judgments. Accepting that
individuals may bring political objections to the courts in that posture, it is hard to
see sound reasons for denying states the same opportunity.
B. STATES LITIGATING INDIVIDUALS' INTERESTS
Under ACA, the easy question is states' standing to challenge Medicaid
expansion because those new federal requirements operate directly on states. 58 The
hard question is states' standing to challenge the individual mandate, which, by its
terms, does not operate on states, but rather on state inhabitants.5 9 The law is well
settled that states cannot sue merely as nominal plaintiffs, asserting the rights of
their citizens against enforcement of federal laws. But when states claim concrete,
particularized injuries to their own rights and interests, courts should recognize state
standing. Moreover, there seems to be no harm in further allowing states that have
satisfied the constitutional minimum for standing also to litigate their citizens'
interests in maintaining limits on federal power.
Under the established Mellon doctrine, states cannot maintain suits merely as
representatives of citizens to protect them against unconstitutional congressional
acts. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought to
challenge the constitutionality of the Federal Maternity Leave Act, which
appropriated federal funds for maternal and child health and gave states the option of
cooperating with the federal government's efforts. 6 1 Massachusetts had not yet opted
into the program but alleged that the federal law invaded its "rights and powers as a
sovereign state and the rights of its citizens.", 62 Rejecting the Commonwealth's
assertion of standing, the Court first noted that the Maternity Leave Act did not
invade state powers because the Constitution does not obligate states to assist the
federal government. 63 The only other burden that the Commonwealth could assert
was taxation, which fell upon state inhabitants, not the state itself 64 The Court
concluded that the Commonwealth could not maintain a suit as a representative of its
citizens, noting that states have no "duty or power to enforce their [citizens'] rights
in respect of their relations with the federal government. In that field it is the United
" Id. at 1739-40, 1746 (observing that some collective action problems, such as the difficulty
individuals with pre-existing conditions face obtaining insurance, may call for a national solution and
that striking down the individual mandate on structural grounds would prevent Congress from
addressing those problems, even if states are simply unable). But see Neil S. Siegel, Four
Constitutional Limits that the Minimum Coverage Provision Respects, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 591,
607-09 (2011) (suggesting that congressional exercise of commerce power to mandate purchase of
health insurance could be justified as a collective action problem).
" See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West 2012) (listing requirements for state plans
to receive federal matching dollars, expanding Medicaid eligibility).
'9 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a)-(b) (West 2012) (mandating that "an applicable individual" maintain
minimum essential coverage" and providing penalties for noncompliance).
60 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923); see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note
I, at 490-92.61 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 479.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 480.
64 Id. at 482.
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States, and not the state, which represents them as parens patriae .... ,,65 As the
Court summarized in a later case: "If the State is only a nominal party without a real
interest of its own-then it will not have standing under the parens patriae
doctrine.,
66
The Court, however, has recognized state standing when proprietary, sovereign,
and quasi-sovereign interests are at stake.67 First, states may maintain standing to
redress injury to their own proprietary interests, such as owning land, streams, and
highways, or engaging in business ventures like private proprietors.68 Second, states
have standing to litigate questions of sovereignty, such as border disputes. 69 More
difficult sovereign standing questions arise over states' governing interests, that is,
the exercise of sovereign power "to create and enforce a legal code.",70 If a state
claims that its own rights, not merely its citizens' rights, are implicated, the Court
may recognize standing. For example, states are allowed to challenge federal laws
that purport to apply directly to state governments,7' like Medicaid,72 or interfere
with recognized state regulatory power, such as voting requirements. 7' In
challenging the Federal Voting Rights Act, a state could not, however, assert due
process, bill of attainder, or separation of powers arguments, as those rights
belonged to citizens, not the states.74 The state interest in voting derived from the
Constitution's recognition of general state control of election qualifications.75
The third category of state standing cases, dubbed "quasi-sovereign interests,"
involves "interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace. 76 The state
interest, however, must still be sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy
with the defendant. 77 "[T]he State must articulate an interest apart from the interests
of particular private parties-that is, the State must be more than a nominal party.
' 78
Applying those principles, the Court in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico
allowed Puerto Rico to bring suit against Virginia apple growers for violating federal
law by favoring domestic laborers over foreign temporary laborers. 79 The Court
65 Id. at 486.
66 Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) (citing cases).
67 Id. at 600-02 (setting out categories of cases); Schapiro, supra note I, at 989-93 (describing
same).
66 See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601-02; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (allowing
one state to sue another state on its own behalf and as representative of consuming public over state
law restricting natural gas pipelines); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 989 (describing states' proprietary
interests).
69 Snapp, 485 U.S. at 601 (regarding "maintenance and recognition of borders"); Woolhandler &
Collins, supra note 1, at 415-16 (summarizing cases).
70Snapp, 485 U.S. at 601.
71 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203 (1987); see also Schapiro, supra note 1, at 990.
72 See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1256-66
(1 th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011)
(mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and
cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).
73 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 990; Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 1, at 492-93.
74 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323-24.
" Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 119-25 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 4, and noting limited federal
authority under 15th Amendment).
76 Alfred L. Snapp & Son. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 593.
79 id.
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recognized states' "interest in the health and well-being of its residents," beyond
mere physical effects of air and water pollution, and other tangible threats. 80
Accordingly, Puerto Rico had an interest in protecting residents from the harmful
effects of discrimination. 8 1 Puerto Rico's interest was particularly strong given the
pervasiveness of ethnic discrimination.8 2 The Court further recognized Puerto Rico's
parens patriae standing to assert its residents' interests in the federal employment
scheme, given the Commonwealth's participation in that scheme and its legitimate
83
concern for state unemployment.
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency 84 is a recent example of
quasi-sovereign interest standing in an action against, not another state, but the
federal government. In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, the
Supreme Court considered a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) refusal to regulate greenhouse gases that were contributing to global
warming. 85 The Court recognized that absent the plaintiff-states, it would have been
difficult for any private individuals or organizations to "allege 'particularized
injuries' to themselves," as opposed to "humanity at large," as a result of global
warming. 86 The generalized harm of rising sea levels and loss of coastal property
was a "far cry" from the type of harm typically cognizable under Article 111.87 But
state intervention, particularly that of Massachusetts, which owned much of the
affected territory, preserved standing and allowed the Court to exercise
jurisdiction. 88 "That these climate-change risks are 'widely shared' does not
minimize Massachusetts' interest in the outcome of this litigation." 89 Further
recognizing Massachusetts's "stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests," the
Court gave "special solicitude" to the Commonwealth's assertion of standing. 90
Applying established injury-in-fact and redressability requirements for standing, the
Court concluded that the EPA's refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions created
actual and imminent risk of harm to Massachusetts, and that judicial intervention
likely would prompt EPA to reduce that risk.91
State standing to challenge the ACA's individual health insurance mandate,
arguably, could be asserted on the basis of sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests.
States clearly have a sovereign interest in expansion of Medicaid eligibility.92 From
8o Id. at 609; Schapiro, supra note 1, at 992 (summarizing the case).
81 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609.
82 id.
83 Id. at 609-10; see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (allowing state
standing in antitrust action on proprietary and parens patriae grounds).
84 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
8 Id. at 504.
86Id. at 514-15 (quoting Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50, 60 (2005) (Sentelle,
J., dissenting)).
87 Id. at 515 (quoting Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 66 (Tatel, J., dissenting)).
88 Id. at 522 ("Because the Commonwealth 'owns a substantial portion of the state's coastal
property,' ... it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner." (internal citation
omitted)).
89 Id. (citing and quoting FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)).
'0 Id. at 520.
"' Id. at 521.
92 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 1, at 508-09 (urging that "courts should allow states
standing to challenge federal legislation that regulates state administrative machinery directly" and
citing cases, including New York v. United States). Unlike the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in
Mellon, states challenging ACA's Medicaid provisions long ago agreed to participate in that
cooperative program.
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that clear basis for standing, states might bootstrap standing to challenge the
individual mandate by asserting that the mandate is likely to have a "woodwork
effect" of more individuals applying and qualifying for Medicaid, thereby increasing
states' financial burden.93 Alternatively, states that have enacted so-called Health
Care Freedom Acts (HCFAs) 94 purporting to shield state residents from the federal
mandate to obtain health insurance, might assert sovereign interest in enforcing their
own state laws. 95 The Court's "special solicitude" for state standing in
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, and recognition of states' quasi-
sovereign interests in protecting individual citizens' health and well-being in Snapp,
might extend to the ACA context. Under either theory, however, states, would still
need to assert actual or imminent risk of harm to their own interests as states, rather
than the interests of individual state residents, resulting from the minimum essential
coverage requirement.
III. LOWER COURT ACA STANDING DECISIONS
In granting certiorari in Florida v. Department of Health & Human Services, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear some procedural issues but not the standing
question. 96 As long as an individual plaintiff or the association remains involved in
the lawsuit, the individual mandate issue is properly raised.97 Likewise, as long as
states remain plaintiffs, the Medicaid issue is properly raised. 98 Lower courts hearing
ACA challenges, brought by various individual and state litigants, reached different
outcomes on the standing issues before them.
As the following description of cases shows, at least one circuit court firmly
held that a state cannot litigate individual residents' interests in opposing the
individual mandate. The only other circuit court to hear the question whether a state
had standing to challenge the individual mandate dodged it. In a few cases, public
officials asserted standing to raise states' interests, but courts uniformly rejected
those claims unless the officials also evidenced concrete, particularized injury to
93 See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243
(1 th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub noma. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011)
(mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and
cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012); infra Part III
(discussing state standing analysis in the case).
94 See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-34301:1 (2010) ("No resident of this Commonwealth ... shall
be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual health insurance coverage."). See generally
THE TENTH AMENDMENT CTR., HEALTH CARE FREEDOM ACT,
http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/nullification/health-care/.
'5 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (ED. Va. 2010), rev'd, 656
F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-
420); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 998-1002 (discussing district court opinion and suggesting that state
involvement facilitated justiciability of the claim).
96 The Court agreed to hear arguments on whether the individuals' challenge to the individual
mandate is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (No.
11-400), and whether the individual mandate, if unconstitutional, is severable from the rest of ACA,
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 123 S. Ct. 604.
97 See supra note 10 (describing substitution of individual plaintiffs in the Florida lawsuit before
the Supreme Court).
9' Cf Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (regarding whether
individual Medicaid beneficiaries and providers can bring Supremacy Clause challenge to enjoin
states' compliance with federal medical requirements); see also Douglas v. indep. Living Ctr. of
Southern California, OYEZ (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-
2019/2011/2011 09_958.
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themselves. Regarding individual citizens' standing, several courts questioned
whether plaintiffs alleged injury-in-fact as a result of the individual mandate. But as
long as plaintiffs made proper recitations of present-day particularized injury, courts
allowed them to assert structural federalism challenges. The courts that did not
dismiss cases on standing were divided on the merits of the ACA's constitutionality.
A. CASES RECOGNIZING STANDING 99
Five lower court decisions recognized individual plaintiffs' standing to
challenge the individual mandate as long as the plaintiffs alleged facts demonstrating
present-day injury-in-fact resulting from the future effective date of the mandate.
Courts generally rejected as too speculative defendants' suggestions that some or all
plaintiffs might have changed circumstances and, thus, would not necessarily be
subject to the individual mandate and its penalty for non-compliance. One large
employer plaintiff had standing to challenge the employer penalty for failing to offer
health insurance plans to employees, based on allegations that it, like the individual
plaintiffs, was forced to change its current business and financial practices to prepare
for the 2014 effective date of the ACA's employer responsibility provisions.
One circuit court also recognized, at least in theory, state standing to challenge
the individual mandate, although that conclusion was not necessary because
individual plaintiffs involved in the same suit also had standing. According to
another court, public officials did not have standing based on their official status and
political objections to ACA or federal health reform policy.
1. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Department of Health & Human Services0 0
Florida v. Department of Health & Human Services, the case now before the
Supreme Court, 10' originated in the Northern District of Florida before Judge Roger
Vinson. In a sweeping opinion that ultimately struck down the individual mandate as
unconstitutional and not severable from the rest of ACA, 10 2 Judge Vinson first held
that the two individuals challenging the individual mandate had standing. 0 3 Judge
Vinson's ruling was based on the individuals' declarations that the mandate,
although not in effect until 2014, required them presently to investigate the impact
that compliance with the individual mandate would have on their personal and
business finances. 104 Mary Brown, a small business owner and member of the
association plaintiff NFIB, asserted that requiring her to purchase health insurance,
which she neither wanted nor needed, threatened her ability to operate her
business.'0 5 Kaj Ahlburg, an unemployed retiree who was too young to qualify for
99 See infra Appendix A.
'00 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11 th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398)
(mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400)
(mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).
10 Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 603 (No. 11-393) (mem.); Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (No.
11-398) (mem.); Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (No. 11-400) (mem.).
102 See Florida ex rel. Atty Gen., 648 F.3d at 1305-06 (1 lth Cir. 2011).
"o id. at 1272.
'04 Id. at 1270-71; see also Florida, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1144-48 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing
defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
'05 Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1270-71.
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Medicare, similarly asserted that forcing him to purchase health insurance was not a
sensible use of his financial resources and would require him to divert funds from
other personal and family priorities.' °6 The court noted that most other district courts
deciding the individual standing issue held similarly, based on the present-day
economic pressures that individuals face in planning for the 2014 effective date of
the individual mandate.1 °7 Judge Vinson further held that "[b]ecause the individual
plaintiffs have demonstrated standing, including NFIB member Mary Brown, that
means ... that NFIB has associational standing as well."'
0 8
On the question of states' standing, Judge Vinson noted that at least two of the
plaintiff-states, Idaho and Utah, had passed legislation protecting their citizens from
any requirement to purchase health insurance. Judge Vinson held that those two
states had adequate standing based on the existence of a validly enacted state law,
which triggered the duty of the states' attorneys general "to defend the law and the
associated sovereign power to enact it."' 0 9 As long as some of the plaintiff-states had
standing, there was no need to consider the remaining states' assertions of standing
to challenge the individual mandate."1
0
The Eleventh Circuit largely affirmed the district court's standing analysis, first
noting that the federal government did not contest the standing of the individual
plaintiffs or NFIB, nor the states' interests in challenging the Medicaid expansion. 1
The only remaining question was whether the states had standing to challenge the
individual mandate.' 1 2 The states firmly rejected the suggestion that their standing
was based on parens partriae, as representatives of their citizens." 3 Instead, they
asserted standing to challenge the individual mandate on three grounds: first, the
individual mandate would necessarily increase Medicaid enrollment, thereby
burdening states; second, if any unconstitutional provisions of the ACA were not
severable, states' clear standing to challenge Medicaid expansion would also give
them standing to challenge the individual mandate; and, third, the federal mandate
infringed on state sovereignty to enforce state laws, such as Utah's, Idaho's, and
other states' HCFAs, which expressly shield state residents from any requirement to
maintain insurance.l1 4 The first assertion turned out to be the key to state standing to
challenge the individual mandate. By the time the Eleventh Circuit ruled, the Fourth
Circuit had rejected the third ground in Virginia's go-it-alone ACA lawsuit. 115 The
second ground ultimately was unavailing because the Eleventh Circuit, although
striking down the individual mandate, held it severable from the rest of ACA. That
06 Id. at 1270.
107 Id. at 1271-72.
0' Id. at 1272.
'
09d. (quoting Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605-06 (E.D. Va.
2010), rev'd, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30,
2011) (No. 11-420). See infra Part Ill.B.1 for a discussion of the Virginia standing decision,
ultimately overruling Judge Hudson's opinion.
110 Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
See Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (1lth
Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub noma. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011)
(mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and
cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
"5 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for
cert. filed 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420).
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left just the Medicaid bootstrap grounds for standing. Regardless, the presence and
clear standing of the individual and association plaintiffs to challenge the individual
mandate rendered the state standing question "purely academic and one that [the
court] need not confront."' 16 As long as at least one plaintiff has standing on each
claim, the court need not address whether the remaining plaintiffs have standing on
that issue.
2. Thomas More Law Center v. Obama"
7
Plaintiffs in Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, a Sixth Circuit opinion that
upheld the individual mandate as constitutional under the commerce power, 118
involved a public interest law firm and four individuals. The law firm did not claim
any injury to itself as an employer, asserting only claims on behalf of its members,
two of the individuals. 19 The individuals were U.S. citizens, Michigan residents, and
federal taxpayers who claimed that the individual mandate would compel them to
purchase health insurance. 120 The individuals declared that the impending
requirement to purchase health insurance changed their present spending and saving
habits.' 2' They further alleged imminent future injury by operation of the January 1,
2014, effective date of the individual mandate. 122 The court deemed suggestions that
the individuals could die, leave the country, or become exempt from the individual
mandate requirement too speculative to defeat standing.' 23 Moreover, the fact that
one of the plaintiffs purchased insurance after filing the lawsuit did not alter the
court's decision because ACA requires individuals not only to obtain, but also to
maintain, minimum essential coverage.
124
The court concluded: "In view of the probability, indeed virtual certainty, that
the minimum coverage provision will apply to the plaintiffs on January 1, 2014, no
function of standing law is advanced by requiring plaintiffs to wait until six months
or one year before the effective date to file this lawsuit."' 125 Moreover, by permitting
the lawsuit to be filed presently, "all three layers of the federal judiciary will be able
to reach considered merits decisions, as opposed to rushed interim (e.g., stay)
decisions." 126 Having found standing, 127 the court reached the merits of the
plaintiffs' challenge and held that the minimum coverage requirement was a valid
exercise of the federal commerce power.
128
116 Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1243.
"' 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 201 1), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11-117).
..8 Id. at 549.
"
9 Id. at 533.
120 id.
2' Id. at 536.
122 id.
2' Id. at 537.
124 id.
125 Id. at 538.
126 id.
127 The court also held that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the plaintiffs' challenge. Id.
at 540.
128 Id. at 549.
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3. Liberty University v. Geithner" 9
A variety of plaintiffs, including public officials, individuals, a physician, and a
large employer, challenged the individual mandate in Liberty University v.
Geithner. 30 The district court dismissed three of the plaintiffs for lack of standing
but allowed claims by three others to go forward. 131 The first two dismissed
plaintiffs' asserted standing in their status as lawmakers and based on their policy
objections to the federal law. Kathy Byron, a member of the Virginia House of
Delegates, voted for Virginia's HCFA, and Jeff Helgeson, a Lynchburg, Virginia,
city council member, believed that ACA would have a negative impact on the city.
13 2
Neither alleged personal injury by operation of the individual mandate or current
lack of health insurance. 133 The court held their asserted grounds for standing
unavailing. 134 The court also dismissed Dr. David Stein, who asserted standing based
on speculation that the ACA's regulations would adversely impact his Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement rates and his liberty interests in practicing his profession
and providing care to his patients.' 35 The court found those pleadings too vague and
conclusory to support standing.
136
The case also involved two other individuals and a non-profit corporation,
Liberty University. The individuals, Michele Waddell and Joanne Merrill, alleged
that the individual mandate, at the present time, required them to make changes to
their personal finances and lifestyles to comply with the new law. 17 Liberty
University, which employed 3900 full-time employees, challenged the ACA's
requirement that employers of fifty or more full-time employees offer minimum
essential health insurance to their employees or face civil penalties. 138 Liberty
University alleged that it would "incur 'significant and costly changes' in its daily
business operations well before 2014" to provide the required coverage.' 39 The court
held the allegations of these three plaintiffs sufficient to support standing.
40
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed only the latter three plaintiffs' claims
and did not review the standing question. 14' Rather than dismissing the individuals
and Liberty University for lack of standing, the court held that all claims were barred
as pre-enforcement actions seeking to enjoin the ACA's individual mandate and
employer penalty provisions. 142 According to the court, the challenged provisions
constituted "taxes" for purposes of the Federal Tax Anti-Injunction Act (TAIA) and,
therefore, were jurisdictionally barred. 143 This procedural question, but not the
129 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir.
Sept. 8, 201 1), petition for certfiled, 80 U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2011) (No. 11-438).
130 This lawsuit was separate from the Commonwealth of Virginia's lawsuit challenging the
individual mandate. See infra Part I1I.B. 1 (discussing Virginia's solo lawsuit).
131 See Liberty Univ., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22, 626.
132 id. at 621 n.6.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 621.
131 Id. at 622 n.7.
136 id.
137 Id. at 623.
138 Id. at 622.
139 Id. at 622-23.
140 Id. at 626.
141 See Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for
certfled, 80 U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2011) (No. 11-438).
142 Id. at *14.
143 Id. at *4; see 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2006) (providing that "no suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person").
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underlying standing issue, is before the Supreme Court in a separate grant of
certiorari. 1'4
4. Seven-Sky v. Holder
145
Seven-Sky v. Holder involved four U.S. citizens and federal taxpayers seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the individual mandate's enforcement. 146
As in other cases, the individuals asserted imminent future injury based on the
penalty that they would be required to pay, beginning in 2014, for failing to obtain
minimum essential coverage. 47 They also alleged present actual injury by having to
rearrange their finances to prepare for the mandate's 2014 effective date. 48 One of
the individuals, Mary Mead, would have been eligible for Medicare by the time the
individual mandate took effect, but nonetheless asserted that she would refuse to
enroll when she became eligible. 149 Even setting Mead aside, the remaining
plaintiffs, absent some change in life circumstances, would be subject to the penalty
in 2014.15° Like the Sixth Circuit in Thomas More, the D.C. District Court did not
insist on "absolute certainty" that the individuals would be penalized for failing to
have insurance in 2014.' 5 1 The substantial probability that they would be adversely
affected sufficed. 152 Moreover, their present-day conduct to prepare for the future
mandate sufficed for injury-in-fact. 153 The plaintiffs alleged that the pending
individual mandate required them to forgo spending discretionary income, donating
to charity, paying down debt, and saving for their children's college education.
5 4
On the merits, the district court granted the federal government's motion to
dismiss, upholding the mandate under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and
Proper Clause, but rejecting the plaintiffs Religious Freedom and Restoration Act
(RFRA) claim.' 55 The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed dismissal of the RFRA claim. 156
The appellate court considered at some length, and Judge Kavanaugh wrote an even
longer dissent on, 157 the application of the Federal TAIA to bar a pre-enforcement
challenge to the minimum essential coverage requirement. 158 The court ultimately
144 See Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.)
(granting review of question "[w]hether the suit brought by respondents to challenge the minimum
coverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is barred by the Anti-Injunction
Act, 26 U.S.C. § 742 1(a)").
' 661 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2011).
141 Id. at 5.
147 See, e.g., Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 23 (D.D.C. 2011), en banc denied sub nom.
Seven-Sky v. Holder, 2011 WL 1113489 (D.C. Cir. Mar 17, 2011), aff'd, 661 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2011),
petition for cert.filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3359 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2011) (No. 11-679).
148 id.
149 Id.
'50 Id. at 24 (agreeing with Judge Vinson that speculative changed circumstances before or in
2014 did not defeat standing).
151 Id.
52 Id. at 24-25 (citing Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
153 Id. at 26.
154 Id.
' Id. at 33-35.
156 Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 5 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W.
3359 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2011) (No. 11-679).
117 See id. at 21-54 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (dissenting as to jurisdiction and not deciding the
merits).
5
' Id. at 5-14.
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reached the merits, however, and upheld the mandate as falling within Congress's
commerce power.I19
5. Goudy-Bachman v. Department of Health & Human Services'
60
Plaintiffs Barbara Goudy-Bachman and Gregory Bachman, a married couple
with two children, challenged the individual mandate in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. They alleged injury-in-fact on the basis that they were self-employed,
did not carry health insurance, did not qualify for Medicaid, and would not qualify
for Medicare by January 1, 2014. They also were not members of any groups exempt
from compliance with the individual mandate.' 6' The plaintiffs dropped their own
health insurance in 2001 when the premiums exceeded their mortgage payments and
since then have paid for their healthcare costs out-of-pocket. 162 They further averred
that they did not purchase a new car, which they otherwise could afford, because
they would be unable to afford the payments in 2014 when the individual mandate
took effect.163 Comparing the Bachmans' averments to plaintiffs' averments in other
ACA litigation, the district court held that the Bachmans alleged sufficient economic
injury to support standing. 164 The economic impact was immediate in having to
forgo the vehicle purchase and undertake financial planning and budget decisions in
anticipation of 2014. 165 Accordingly, the Bachmans alleged the constitutional
minimum for standing. 166 On the merits, the district court concluded that the
individual mandate exceeded congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce. 167
B. CASES DENYING STANDING
168
Almost twice as many lower court ACA decisions denied standing as recognized
standing. The cases denying standing were brought by a state, state officials,
employers, physicians, individuals, patients, and associations. The one case
involving a state challenged only the individual mandate and was dismissed on the
grounds that the state alleged injury to its citizens' rights, not its own sovereign
interests. Most of the individual plaintiffs' claims were dismissed for failing to
allege sufficient injury-in-fact. One group of plaintiffs was allowed to amend their
pleadings, thereafter reciting the necessary allegations. State officials fared no better
than individuals, even when asserting state interests, because they again failed to
allege personal, concrete injury. Employers, including one state, failed to allege how
ACA was applicable to them.
159 Id. at 20. The plaintiffs have also sought Supreme Court review of this decision. Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d I (No. 11-679), available at http://aca-
litigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/Cert+petition+%2811.30.2011%29.pdf.
6
'No. 1:10-CV-763, 2011 WL 4072875 (M.D. Pa. 2011); see also Goudy-Bachman v. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 764 F. Supp. 2d 684 (M.D. Pa. 2011).161 See Goudy-Bachman, 2011 WL 4072875, at *1.
162 Id. at *2.
163 Id. at *2 n.3 (citing trial court record); 764 F. Supp. 2d. at 690-91 (summarizing plaintiffs'
assertions).
'64 Goudy-Bachman, 2011 WL 4072875, at *2; Goudy-Bachman, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92.165 Goudy-Bachman, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92.
166 Id. at 692.
167 Goudy-Bachman, 2011 WL 4072875, at *1.
168 See infra Appendix B.
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1. Virginia v. Sebelius'
69
In what now seems like a strategic miscalculation, Virginia, and later
Oklahoma, 170 filed lawsuits separate from the other twenty-six state plaintiffs,
challenging only the individual mandate. These two states may have opted to file
separately with the idea that they would have stronger sovereign interest standing
than other states' general Tenth Amendment challenges. Virginia alleged that the
minimum essential coverage requirement in ACA directly conflicted with the
Virginia Health Care Freedom Act (VHCFA).' 7 ' Virginia alleged unique injury to its
sovereign interest in enforcing a validly enacted state law, which ACA
contravened.1 72 That suggestion was echoed by the American Legislative Exchange
Council's playbook, State Legislatures Guide to Repealing ObamaCare, urging
states to enact HCFAs precisely for the purpose of "provid[ing] standing to a state
participating in current litigation against the federal individual mandate."' 173 At least
initially, the strategy seemed effective.
Virginia challenged only the individual mandate, not Medicaid expansion or
other ACA provisions, asserting that the federal individual health insurance mandate
exceeded Congress's enumerated powers and conflicted with existing state law.
7 4
Virginia expressly disclaimed any parens partiae or quasi-sovereign interest in
asserting the rights of its residents 75 and instead asserted its own sovereign interest
in vindicating VHCFA. 176 Judge Henry Hudson of the Eastern District of Virginia
was persuaded, noting that "the Commonwealth is exercising a core sovereign power
because the effect of the federal enactment is to require Virginia to yield under the
Supremacy Clause."'' 77 The court further noted, "'The power to create and enforce a
legal code' is one of the quintessential functions of a state." 178 The state's
participation in the lawsuit did not impede, but in fact facilitated, the justiciability of
the claim, which the TAIA or ripeness doctrine might have barred if brought by
individuals. 179 Although the minimum essential coverage provision does not take
effect until 2014, individuals, insurers, and employers will feel its effects in the near
future. Similarly, the Commonwealth "must revamp its health care programs to
ensure compliance with the enactment's provisions."' 180 Judge Hudson concluded
that Virginia stated a plausible claim that the individual mandate exceeded
169656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 201 1),petition for cert.filed8O U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011)
(No. 11-420).
170 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oklahoma v. Sebelius, No. 6:11 -CV-
00030 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2011).
171 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 268. The Virginia HCFA provides: "No resident of
this Commonwealth ... shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual health insurance
coverage .... "VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-34301:1 (2010).
172 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 268.
173 AM. LEGISLATIVE ExCH. COUNCIL, STATE LEGISLATURES GUIDE TO REPEALING OBAMACARE
12 (2011), available at http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/StateLegGuidetoRepealing_
ObamaCare.pdf.
174 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 266 (noting that "Virginia challenges one provision of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act").
175 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev'd 656
F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petitionfor cert.filed 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982)).
171 See id. at 604-05 (discussing TAIA); id. at 607-08 (discussing ripeness); Schapiro, supra note
1, at 999-1001 (noting that state's involvement overcame ripeness and TAIA obstacles).
180 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
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Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, at least sufficient to survive
dismissal on the pleadings.
181
The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's standing decision. The
essence of Virginia's claim, according to the appellate court, was "to litigate as
parens patriae by asserting the rights of its citizens."' 182 Under the well-established
Mellon doctrine, 183 the court declined to recognize any cognizable state interest in
protecting a state's residents from operation of a federal statute. 184 The Fourth
Circuit dismissed the VHCFA as merely "a smokescreen for Virginia's attempted
vindication of its citizens' interests."' 185 Moreover, a state could not "acquire some
special stake in the relationship between its citizens and the federal government
merely by memorializing its litigation posture in a statute."' 86 Accordingly, the court
denied Virginia standing to challenge the individual mandate. The federal
government has moved to dismiss the Oklahoma case on similar grounds. '
87
The Eleventh Circuit, in Florida v. Department of Health & Human Services,' 8
was able to reach a different conclusion on standing because plaintiffs included both
state and private plaintiffs who brought challenges to both the individual mandate
and Medicaid expansion. 189 Virginia's go-it-alone strategy, as it turned out, was
flawed in at least three respects: first, by failing to include an individual litigant to
challenge the individual mandate,' 90 or a Medicaid challenge in which the state of
Virginia had a clear interest;191 second, for believing that enacting a state statute
contrary to ACA could create an injury-in-fact where such otherwise did not exist;
and third, for failing to assert concrete, particularized injury to its own interests in
preparing for the individual mandate's future effective date.
2. Baldwin v. Sebelius
192
A California case highlights the type of allegations that individuals, employers,
and associations must make to challenge the individual mandate. The Ninth Circuit
"' Id. at 612.
182 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 268.
183 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923); see supra Part II.B (discussing Mellon
doctrine)
184 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 269; see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Not
So Fast-Jurisdictional Barriers to the ACA Litigation, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. e34(l), e34(2) (2011)
(noting Fourth Circuit's holding "invoking well-settled law that states may not sue to protect their
citizens from federal law, since state citizens are also federal citizens"), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/l 0.1056INEJMpl 111295.
185 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 269.
..
6 Id. at 271.
187 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Oklahoma v.
Sebelius, No. 6:11-CV-00030-RAW (E.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://aca-
litigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/U.S.+motion+to+dismiss+%2803.28.11 %29.pdf.
188 See supra Part lII.A. I (describing the Florida decision).
189 Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (1 1th Cir.
2011), cert. granted sub noam. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.),
and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert.
granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).
190 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 536 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for
cert. filed, (U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11-117) (noting that individual plaintiffs demonstrated actual
injury by showing that impending requirement to buy health insurance changed their spending and
saving habits).
191 See Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1244 (concluding that "the state plaintiffs
undeniably have standing to challenge the Medicaid provisions").
'9' 654 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2011).
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ultimately denied standing to Steve Baldwin, a former member of the California
legislature, and the Pacific Justice Institute ("Institute"), a legal defense
organization.' 93 Baldwin challenged the individual mandate as exceeding Congress's
authority under Article I but asserted no particularized injury.' 94 The court rejected
plaintiff Baldwin's asserted standing to raise a generalized grievance about
government, "claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws.' 195 Baldwin failed to aver that he currently
lacked qualifying health insurance, would not have it in 2014, or had to save money
now to purchase it in 2014.196 According to the Ninth Circuit, Baldwin's suggestion
that he had to take investigatory steps to determine whether he would be in
compliance with the law did not establish a particularized injury distinct from
everyone else to whom the ACA applies.
197
The Institute lacked standing as either an employer or association representing
individuals. 198 As a putative plaintiff challenging the ACA's employer penalty, the
Institute failed to allege that it had more than fifty employees, which is required for
the penalty to apply.' 99 As an association representing individuals challenging the
individual mandate, the Institute lacked standing because the individuals lacked
standing.
200
3. New Jersey Physicians v. Obama
20 1
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied standing in a case brought by Dr.
Mario Criscito, a licensed New Jersey physician; a patient of Dr. Criscito's ("Roe");
and New Jersey Physicians, Inc., a non-profit corporation. 202 The plaintiffs
challenged the ACA's individual mandate and employer responsibility provisions.
20 3
Roe asserted merely that he was a patient who paid for his own medical care. He did
not allege facts demonstrating that he would be subject to the individual mandate or
that the mandate, if applicable, would change his current choice to pay for his
medical care out of pocket. 20 4 Dr. Criscito's allegation that he was a physician who
treated patients, some of whom were self-pay, was similarly insufficient for failing
to allege that he was suffering or would suffer imminent, concrete injury. 20 5 The
Third Circuit held that Dr. Criscito's further allegation that the ACA would impact
his medical practice and the manner in which he sought payment and treated patients
was also conjectural.20 6 The New Jersey Physician's associational standing failed
1' Id. at 880.
114 id. at 879.
'95 Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992)).
196 id.
197 id.
198 id.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 879-80.
201 653 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011).
202 Id. at 236; see 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (a), (c)(2)(A) (defining "applicable large employer" as "an
employer who employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the
preceding calendar year").
203 See N.J. Physicians, 653 F.3d at 236-37 (citing 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5000A, 4980H (West 2012)).
204 Id. at 239.
200 Id. at 240
216 Id. at 241.
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inasmuch as there was no particularized injury to the only member of the group, Dr.
Criscito, identified in the complaint.
20 7
4. Purpura v. Sebelius
20 8
The Third Circuit affirmed its standing decision in New Jersey Physicians in
Purpura v. Sebelius.2 0 9 Purpura involved a claim by two pro se plaintiffs, asserting
only that they were New Jersey residents who believed that ACA was
unconstitutional. 210 The Purpura plaintiffs' allegations of standing, like Roe's
allegations in New Jersey Physicians, were "factually barren."' 21 1 The court also
rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on Bond, distinguishing that case because the
plaintiffs incarceration under the allegedly unlawful federal statute constituted a
concrete injury, fairly redressable by invalidation of the conviction.2 1 2 By contrast,
the Pupura plaintiffs alleged no concrete, particularized injury.21 3
5. Bryant v. Holder
214
Another case testing standing to challenge the individual mandate involved
private individuals residing in Mississippi and Mississippi's Lieutenant Governor
Phil Bryant.2 5 The private plaintiffs asserted standing based on the threatened injury
of being forced to purchase health insurance and manage their finances in
preparation for complying with the mandate. 21 6 Lieutenant Governor Bryant asserted
standing as a state employee, first, because the mandate would compel the state to
offer employee insurance plans complying with the ACA's requirements, and,
second, because he would be unable to drop his own state employee health plan
without incurring the tax penalty.2 1 7 The plaintiffs' asserted commerce power, taxing
power, takings, substantive due process, and Tenth Amendment challenges to the
individual mandate.
218
The Southern District of Mississippi held that the ten private individual
plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege that they would even be
subject to the individual mandate, as opposed to exempt on various grounds, and,
even if subject, that they would incur the tax penalty for non-compliance. 1 9 With
respect to Lieutenant Governor Bryant, the court held that he failed to allege facts to
show "certainly impending" injury or that he would be subject to the tax penalty. °2 2
Bryant's separate allegations of injury to Mississippi's sovereign interests were
unavailing as asserted in his private, individual capacity. The court noted that even if
207 id.
208 446 Fed. Appx. 496 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1037 (2012), reh 'g denied, No. II-
7275, 2012 WL 538800 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012).
209 id.
2"0 Id. at 497-98.
211 Id. (quoting N.J. Physicians, 653 F.3d 234, 239 (3d Cir. 2011)).
212 Id. (citing Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011)).
213 id.
214 809 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Miss. 2011); Bryant v. Holder, 2:10-CV-76-KS-MTP, 2011 WL
710693 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2011).
215 Bryant, 2011 WL 710693, at *2.
216 id.
217 id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at * 11.
220 Id. at * 12.
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an individual had standing to assert a Tenth Amendment claim regarding state
power, he would still have to demonstrate particularized injury-in-fact. 221
The ten individual plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint to allege
particularized, present-day injuries. All alleged that they were forgoing certain
spending to save money to pay the ACA penalties and had made "significant and
costly changes" to their lifestyles and personal finances to prepare for "the
individual mandate's looming enforcement in 2014. ",222 In a subsequent opinion, the
court deemed those amended allegations sufficient to support standing.223
The district court revisited Bryant's standing to assert Mississippi's sovereign
interest after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bond,224 noting the
Court's holding that an individual challenging a federal statute "on the basis that it
interferes with state sovereignty seeks vindication of his own constitutional
,225interests-not just those of the state." Bond expressly recognized that federalism
protects not only state sovereignty but also enhances individual freedom by diffusing
power vertically between the federal government and separate states.226 Accordingly,
laws that upset the constitutional structure also may give rise to individual injury.227
On the facts, however, the Mississippi court again concluded that Bryant failed to
allege imminent, concrete harm inasmuch as the individual mandate was not yet in
effect. Moreover, it was not certain that he would still be a state employee when it
228became effective. In sum, Bond's recognition of a private plaintiffs Tenth
Amendment claim still required injury-in-fact to be justiciable.
6. Kinder v. Geithner
229
Several individuals, including Missouri's Lieutenant Governor Peter Kinder,
challenged several provisions of ACA. Kinder received health insurance through the
state and clarified that he asserted claims only in his individual capacity, not on
behalf of the State of Missouri or as an advocate for other citizens. Other plaintiffs
included elderly individuals eligible for Medicare. Another individual plaintiff was
an uninsured twenty-one-year-old woman. Finally, a mother and her autistic son
joined the lawsuit.23'
The plaintiffs alleged multiple counts, including injuries to both individuals and
232the state. To begin, they asserted that ACA would unconstitutionally commandeer
state officials by requiring the state first to establish a reinsurance program for
private insurance plans and, second, to maintain health benefit plans for state
employees or face a stiff penalty.233 Although Kinder previously denied any reliance
221 Id. at *12 n.7.
222 Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (S.D. Miss. 2011).
223 Id.
224 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
225 Bryant, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (citing Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2360).
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 569.
229 1: 10 CV 101 RWS, 2011 WL 1576721 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011).
230 Id. at *2 (noting that Kinder initially indicated that he was suing in his individual capacity and
"as an advocate for the elderly" but that his amended complaint did not appear to rely on being an
advocate and that basis of standing was not considered).
231 Id. at * 1.
232Id. at *4-10.
233 Id. at *4.
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on his official status to assert standing with respect to these Tenth Amendment
challenges, he alleged specific injury because ACA burdened his performance of
duties as an elected official.234 The court did not allow Kinder to change postures for
the purpose of raising those claims.235 Therefore, hewing to the rule that a plaintiff
must assert his own legal rights and interests, not those of third parties, the court
denied standing to all the plaintiffs on claims alleging burdens on the state. 36 Citing
an Eighth Circuit opinion, United States v. Hacker,237 the Missouri District Court
reasoned precisely the opposite of Justice Kennedy in Bond, to wit: "[A] private
party does not have standing to assert that the federal government is encroaching on
state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment absent the involvement of a
state or its instrumentalities., 238 The court observed that the State of Missouri might
239have standing to assert those claims, but individual residents of the state do not.
The plaintiffs further challenged the requirement that the State of Missouri, as
an employer, would have to provide health benefits to employees. 240 On that count,
Kinder asserted standing as a state employee who recruited and hired employees,
suggesting that the cost of insurance would affect his ability to perform his duties. 24I
The court concluded that Kinder could not claim any injury because his term ends in
January 2013, a year before the employer responsibility provision takes effect.
242
Moreover, he did not assert that he would be "injured," but merely "affected," by the
requirement to offer health insurance to state employees. 2 43 The other individual
plaintiffs claimed injury because the employer health plan requirement would
increase costs to Missouri taxpayers. 244 The court deemed that assertion too
speculative and again contrary to the cited language in Hacker.
2 45
The plaintiffs' various challenges to the individual mandate also failed to satisfy
the constitutional minimum for standing because the plaintiffs did not allege any
injury.246 For example, the twenty-one-year-old plaintiff incorrectly asserted that she
would be subject to the penalty because she desired to purchase only catastrophic
health insurance. 247 ACA, however, expressly provides that very option for
individuals under the age of thirty. 248 The court deemed other assertions too
speculative as plaintiffs failed to allege that they, in fact, would not purchase health
insurance in 2014, only that they would be subject to the ACA's penalty if they did
not. 249 The plaintiffs' reliance on rights that the Missouri HCFA ostensibly
234 id.
235 id.
236 Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982)).
237 565 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009).
238 Kinder, 2011 WL 1576721, at *4 (quoting Hacker, 565 F.3d at 526).
239 Id.240 Id. at *5.
241 id.
242 id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.; see infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.2 46 Kinder, 2011 WL 1576721, at *6.
247 id.
248 Id.; see 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e) (West 2012).
249 Kinder, 2011 WL 1576721, at *6.
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protected 250 was also unavailing as they did not allege that they did not currently
participate in the healthcare system or maintain health insurance. 25
Finally, plaintiffs vaguely alleged that section 4003 of the ACA, empowering
the Preventative Services Task Force to conduct cost-effectiveness research, violated
their liberty interests in making personal medical decisions and interfered with the
physician-patient relationship 2 The court carefully explained that section 4003 had
no such effect and, moreover, that the plaintiffs failed to allege any actual injury
resulting from section 4003's operation.253 After reviewing additional ripeness and
mootness arguments, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all
counts.
2 5 4
7. Shreeve v. Obama
255
In a would-be class action, Anthony Shreeve and a group of 25,000 other
individuals and entities sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging
"direct and immediate" violations of their constitutional rights.2 56 Specifically, they
asserted that the defendants, Barak Obama, Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, and the
United States, exceeded the scope of their constitutional authority, violated the
Tenth Amendment, and breached their oaths of office to protect and defend the
Constitution. The plaintiffs did not claim any injury by operation of the individual
mandate, such as that they would be compelled to purchase health insurance, or
required to rearrange their financial affairs or prepare presently for the individual
257
mandate's future effective date. Accordingly, the plaintiffs failed to show any
concrete injury or personal stake in the controversy. Their claims were squarely
within the prohibition on generalized grievances about government, "claiming only
harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and
250 259laws." 8 The court, accordingly, dismissed all the claims.
8. Bellow v. Department of Health and Human Services
260
The case involved a lone pro se plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of the
ACA.26' The Eastern District of Texas construed the plaintiffs vague complaint as
challenging the individual mandate and then looked to other courts' ACA standing
262decisions.. Magistrate Judge Keith Giblin concluded that Bellow's allegations were
more like the Shreeve plaintiffs' generalized grievances about government than the
Florida, Thomas More, Seven-Sky, and Goudy-Bachman plaintiffs' allegations of
particular financial and business rearrangements necessitated by the individual
250 Missouri Health Care Freedom Act, Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 1.330(1) (West 2012) ("No law or rule
shall compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer, or health care provider to participate in any
health care system.").
251 Kinder, 2011 WL 1576721, at *7.
252 id.
253 Id. at *7-8.
254 Id. at *8-10.
255 1:10-CV-71, 2010 WL 4628177 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010).
216 Id. at *1-*3.
257 Id. at *4.
258 Id. at *3 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992)).
259 Id. at *7.
60 No. 1:10-CV-165, 2011 WL 2470456 (E.D. Tex. June 18, 2011).
261 Id. at *1.
262 Id. at *6.
HeinOnline  -- 38 Am. J.L. & Med. 434 2012
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT LITIGATION
mandate. 26 3 Bellow's alleged injury that he would be forced to pay for insurance or
264face a penalty in 2014 was "purely hypothetical" and not immediate. Accordingly,
Judge Giblin recommended that the case be dismissed.265
9. Peterson v. United States
266
Peterson presented the novel question whether a Medicare recipient has standing
to challenge the ACA and the individual mandate. 267 The New Hampshire District
Court noted that, as a Medicare recipient, "Peterson will not have to incur any
financial burdens, or indeed do anything at all, to satisfy the mandate. The federal
government will satisfy it for him., 268 Accordingly, the court held that he lacked
269standing to challenge the mandate on any of his asserted grounds.
Peterson further alleged that he was injured by the ACA's mere passage, which
caused his Medicare supplemental insurance premiums to rise, 27 and that the Act
might cause him to suffer loss of Medicare benefits in future years. 271 The court
deemed both arguments too speculative and vague. 272 With regard to the
supplemental insurance premium claim, the court noted that the third-party insurer
was not before the court, and thus that Peterson's claim would not be redressed in
the lawsuit. 273 Accordingly, the case was dismissed.
274
IV. RESOLVING THE ACA STANDING PARADOX
The ACA case before the Supreme Court, and lower court decisions, leave an
unresolved standing paradox. Individuals may sue to protect states' interests, but
states may not sue to protect individuals'-or, apparently, their own-interests. That
posture may be the result of strategic error by plaintiff-states or rigid application of
standing doctrine by the courts. In either case, the result does not comport with the
purposes underlying standing in ensuring that the parties with real interests in
resolution of the issues are before the court and maintaining separation of powers.
As long as states meet the same constitutional requirements for standing as
individuals, they should have the same claim to judicial review of federal laws,
especially when the states' challenge is based on structural federalism grounds.
The core legal question before the Supreme Court in the ACA litigation is the
scope of federal enumerated powers vis-A-vis states' reserved powers. 275 Because of
the weakness of personal autonomy or economic liberties claims, private individuals,
employers, and associations challenge the individual mandate as exceeding federal
26 Id. at * 11.
264 Id. at *12.
265 Id. at *13.
266 774 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.H. 2011).
267 Id. at 420.
26 Id. at 424.
269 Id.
270 id.
271 Id. at 425.
272 Id. at 424-25.
273 Id. at 424.
274 Id. at 426.
275 Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.)
(argued Mar. 26-27, 2012) (granting certiorari on the question of whether Congress had the power to
enact the minimum coverage provision).
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commerce and spending powers. 276 Lower courts readily exercised jurisdiction over
those claims as long as the private plaintiffs alleged concrete, particularized harm in
having to prepare for the future effective date of the ACA's requirements. States'
interests in challenging the alleged expansion of federal power is arguably even
more direct than individuals' interest in safeguarding individual rights through the
conduit of structural limits on federal power. 77 Yet lower courts were reluctant to
recognize state standing to challenge the individual mandate on the same structural
grounds.
Individual, employer, and association challenges to ACA are postured as
defenses to potential government enforcement actions. Those plaintiffs allege that
the federal law itself is unconstitutional and therefore cannot be applied against
them. For the most part, lower courts generously accepted individual plaintiffs'
alleged injuries based on present-day financial impact or change in position in
anticipation of the individual mandate's future effective date. The courts rejected as
too speculative the government defendants' suggestions that the plaintiffs might
avoid the mandate by death, emigration, employment, or exemption. 278 Injury
resulting from the individual mandate is easy to allege; any prudent manager of
family or business finances can point to some forgone purchase or change in savings
habits in anticipation of future expenses. 279 Indeed, a group of plaintiffs who were
initially dismissed for lack of standing were allowed to amend their pleadings. They
filed identical amended complaints, which salvaged their case:
In Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition, they alleged that they are
currently "rearranging [their] financial affairs differently than [they]
otherwise would in order to prepare for the January 1, 2014,
implementation of the Individual Mandate." Each Plaintiff alleged that
"he is making decisions to forego certain spending today, so that he
will have the funds to pay for the penalties associated with his
noncompliance and the associated legal costs of defending himself for
noncompliance when the Individual Mandate begins implementation
on January 1, 2014." Finally, each Plaintiff alleged that he has made
"significant and costly changes in . . . personal financial planning,
necessitating significant lifestyle changes and extensive reorganization
of... personal and financial affairs.
2 8
Rote recitations of personal, concrete injury seem sufficient for Article III standing
purposes, 281 even though they do not meaningfully distinguish the individual ACA
276 See supra Part I1 (describing individual rights claims).
277 See supra Part II (describing two ways in which structural federalism could be seen to protect
individual rights).
278 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 537 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for
cert.filed, (U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11-117).
279 See, e.g., Gaudy-Bauchman v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 764 F. Supp. 2d 684,
670-71 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (regarding decision not to purchase a new car, payments for which plaintiffs
could afford absent the individual mandate); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611,
622-23 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011), petition
for cert filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2011) (No. 11-438) (describing large employer's
allegations).
280 See Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. Supp. 2d 563, 566-67 (S.D. Miss. 2011) (recognizing sufficient
injury-in-fact to support standing).
28! Americans who already have health insurance that complies with the individual mandate may
not have standing to challenge the individual mandate. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Sebelius, 654 F.3d 877,
879 (9th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff failed to allege that he lacked health insurance presently and would not
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plaintiffs from any other American generally opposed to the mandate to purchase
health insurance, specifically, or federal health reform, generally. 282 As long as the
claimed injury is real and concrete, and more than a generalized grievance about the
government's proper application of the law, 283 the court is not deprived of
jurisdiction just because the injury is widely shared.284
Without disrupting those and other settled principles of standing, courts could
similarly recognize state standing to challenge the individual mandate. States cannot
sue merely as nominal plaintiffs to protect their inhabitants from unconstitutional
federal laws.285 Nor should states be allowed to legislate around the Mellon doctrine
simply by passing a state statute and then claiming a sovereign interest in enforcing
it. 286 To invoke Article III jurisdiction, states must assert their own rights and
interests. It is not clear whether states' general interest in protecting the domain of
reserved powers from erosion by expanded federal powers is sufficient for standing
purposes. 2 87 It is clear, however, that individuals must allege injury-in-fact resulting
from an allegedly unconstitutional exercise of federal power in order to bring a
Tenth Amendment challenge.2 88 If states make similar allegations, at least in those
have it in 2014); Peterson v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.H. 2011) (rejecting claim by
Medicare beneficiary). But see Seven-Sky v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 23 (D.D.C. 2011), hearing
en banc deniedsub nom. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 2011 WL 1113489 (D.C. Cir. Mar 17, 2011), aff'd, 661
F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2011),petition for cert.filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3359 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2011) (No. 11-679)
(considering Medicare-eligible plaintiffs suggestion that she would refuse to enroll in Medicare);
Bryant, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 566-67 (alleging that ACA requires individuals not only to obtain, but also
to maintain, health insurance).
282 According to recent polls, close to half of Americans oppose ACA. See KAISER HEALTH
TRACKING POLL, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2011), http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8265-F.pdf
(reporting forty-three percent unfavorable and forty-one percent favorable opinions on the federal
health reform law).
283 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
284 See FEC v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 449-50 (1989).
285 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923).
286 Id.; Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for
cert. filed 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420); see Stephen 1. Vladeck, States'
Rights and State Standing, 46 UNIv. RICH. L. REV. 845, 872-74 (2012) (providing normative reasons
for rejecting standing on the allegations in Virginia).
287 See Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. Supp. 2d 563, 569 n.1 (S.D. Miss. 2011) (noting that public
official asserting state sovereign interest would still have to show his own injury-in-fact); Kinder v.
Geithner, No. 1:10-CV-101-RWS, 2011 WL 1576721, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011) (suggesting in
dicta that a state might bring a Tenth Amendment challenge, although denying standing to individuals
or public officials on that ground). Other opinions, not on standing, equivocate on the enforceability
of the Tenth Amendment as a discrete limit on federal powers. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock,
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (urging the Court to extend Tenth Amendment
limits on spending power, similar to commerce power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
177-78 (1992) (recognizing that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from compelling state
governments to regulate pursuant to federal directive but allows Congress to regulate matters directly
and preempt contrary state laws); South Carolina v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (declining to
recognize general Tenth Amendment limit on federal spending power); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 570 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (admonishing Court for failing to give
judicial enforcement to the Tenth Amendment); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)
(concluding that the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered").
288 See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (threat of sanctions under federal law
sufficed for injury-in-fact, allowing individual standing to challenge statute on Tenth Amendment
grounds); Purpura v. Obama, 446 Fed. Appx. 496, 497-98 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1037
(2012), reh'g denied, No. 11-7275, 2012 WL 538800 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (distinguishing Bond
HeinOnline  -- 38 Am. J.L. & Med. 437 2012
438 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 38 NO. 2&3 2012
narrow cases, there seems little harm in allowing them standing to vindicate
289
structural limits on federal power.
The states' ACA challenge to the individual mandate may not squarely fit
recognized categories of state standing-proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-sovereign
interests-but simple application of the injury-in-fact requirement supports the
cognizability of their claims. First consider states' ACA claims under the recognized
categories: states do not assert any proprietary interest, other than one state official's
attempt to challenge the ACA employer responsibility requirements. 290 Even though
a state employer may have an interest in that provision, the official failed to allege
that he was "injured," as opposed to merely "affected," by the requirement or that he
would still be in office as a state employer in 2014.29' Accordingly, the claim was
dismissed for failing to allege concrete, particularized injury.
With respect to sovereign interest standing, Virginia and other states asserted
their interest in enforcing state HCFAs. Two district courts agreed that the existence
of a validly enacted state law triggered the states' attorney generals' "duty ... to
defend the law and the associated sovereign power to enact it."'292 In one case, that
reasoning was squarely rejected on appeal. 293 The Fourth Circuit correctly
admonished Virginia's attempt to legislate its way around the clear prohibition on
parens patriae standing simply by passing a state law purporting to shield state
residents from federal law. 294 Just as states cannot litigate individual rights claims of
295their inhabitants, states cannot enact laws providing that federal law does not
plaintiff from ACA plaintiffs because former challenged current incarceration, which would be
redressed my favorable judicial decision).
289 My suggestion for state standing based on injury-in-fact respects Professor Vladeck's
normative concerns about sovereign interest standing in the Virginia case, including allowing a
conflict between state and federal laws to suffice for injury-in-fact, inviting an end-run around
principles of judicial restraint through state nullification laws, and expanding state standing at the
expense of individual standing. See Vladeck, supra note 286, at 872-73.
290 Kinder, 2011 WL 1576721, at *5.
291 id.
292 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605-06 (E.D. Va. 2010), revd,
656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. II-
420) (noting that the "mere existence of the lawfully-enacted statute is sufficient to trigger the duty of
the Attorney General of Virginia to defend the law and the associated sovereign power to enact it");
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1272 (N.D. Fla.
2011), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.,
Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11 th Cir. 2011),
cert. granted sub noon. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert.
granted sub norn. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (mem.), argued,
No. 11-398 (Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part sub nom., Florida v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (mem.), argued, No. 11-400 (Mar. 28, 2012) (quoting Virginia,
702 F. Supp. 2d at 605-06, and agreeing with Judge Hudson's reasoning with respect to Idaho and
Utah, two states that had enacted HCFAs); see Katherine Mims Crocker, Securing Sovereign State
Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2094-95 (2011) (discussing the Virginia District Court opinion as an
example of sovereign interest standing).
293 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 272. The Eleventh Circuit did not have to decide the
issue of state standing to challenge the individual mandate, including this asserted ground. See
Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1243.
294 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 271. But see generally Kenneth T. Cuccinelli et al.,
State Sovereign Standing: Often Overlooked, But Not Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. 89, 90 (2012)
(Virginia's Attorney General "explain[ing] why those who question Virginia's standing are
fundamentally incorrect").
295 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966) (disallowing the state to
challenge Federal Voting Rights Act on individual rights grounds while recognizing constitutionally
protected sovereign interest in state control of voting qualifications).
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apply to individuals within their borders and then claim injury to their sovereign
interest in enforcing otherwise clearly preempted state law.
296
Sovereign-interest standing, however, does support state challenges to Medicaid
expansion, if not the individual mandate. The ACA's Medicaid conditional funding
requirements operate directly on states whereas the individual mandate operates
most squarely on individuals. 97 Nevertheless, states could plausibly assert standing
to challenge the individual mandate related to their clear standing to challenge
Medicaid expansion. Quite conceivably, enforcement of the individual mandate and
availability of health insurance subsidies through state exchanges will spur more
citizens to apply for coverage. 298 Those incentives, combined with the ACA's
broader Medicaid eligibility rules, will likely result in many more applicants
qualifying for Medicaid than before ACA. 299 As a result, states' burden of covering
both previously and newly eligible beneficiaries will be greater than under Medicaid
expansion alone. 300 The Eleventh Circuit did not squarely decide the Medicaid
bootstrap argument because the individual and association plaintiffs otherwise had
standing to challenge the individual mandate.
30 1
As to the third category of state standing, Virginia expressly disavowed reliance
on quasi-sovereign-interest standing, 302 although a plausible argument could be
made on that basis as well. Supreme Court precedent on quasi-sovereign interest
standing is scant, but the Court has recognized states' judicially cognizable interest
in the health and well-being of their inhabitants when the alleged risk otherwise is
too broad and vague to meet the requirements of individual standing.3 3 The ACA
individual mandate arguably does not present a broad, vague risk of harm, akin to
greenhouse gas emissions,30 4 or full and equal participation in a federal statutory
scheme. 305 Indeed, the very ease with which individual ACA plaintiffs alleged
296 Compare, for example, "trigger laws" that ban abortion within state borders and purport to
take effect as soon as federal law permits. See William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling,
Prospective Overruling and the Revival of "Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902
(1993); Matthew Berns, Note, Trigger Laws, 97 GEO. L.J. 1639 (2009). Those laws have not and
should not be interpreted as allowing states' standing to challenge federal abortion policy.
297 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 1, at 508-09 (suggesting that "courts should allow
states standing where states contest the application of federal regulatory burdens directly on states"
and citing examples, such as wage-hour laws and pollution control).
298 See Edmund Haislmaier & Brian Blase, Obamacare: Impact on States, 2433 BACKGROUNDER
1, 2 (2010), available at http://thf media.s3 .amazonaws.com/20 I 0/pdf/bg2433.pdf.
299 Id.
300 See Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243
(11 th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nora. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011)
(mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and
cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012) (state
plaintiffs alleged standing, in part, "because increased enrollment in Medicaid spurred by the
individual mandate will cost the states millions of dollars in additional Medicaid funding").
301 Id.
302 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev'd, 656
F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. II-
420). 303 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 514-15 (2007) (noting intervention
of states and local governments, including the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which, at least, had
standing, even if individual plaintiffs' injuries were not sufficiently particularized).
304 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 515.
305 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982).
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concrete and particularized injury 30 6 undermines the diffuse injury rationale for
quasi-sovereign interest state standing.
The contours of state standing doctrine announced in the Court's recent
precedent, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, are not entirely
clear. 307 But the decision does not rely solely on quasi-sovereign interests.
Massachusetts also asserted a proprietary interest as a landowner in protecting its
ocean shores from rising sea levels due to global warming. 30 8 Although drawing on
parens patriae and quasi-sovereign interest case-law,3 °9 the Court concluded: "That
Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the 'territory alleged to be affected'
only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently
concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power., 310 The nuances of
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency's holding are not necessary to
recognize state standing in the ACA litigation. The Court's "special solicitude" 31 1 to
state interests in challenging federal laws should at least encompass standing parity,
if not a "special pass into court,, 312 to states. As long as states allege concrete,
particularized injury to their own interests as a result of the individual mandate they
should be allowed access to federal courts.
The most straightforward analysis of state standing in the ACA litigation is to
apply the well-established injury-in-fact requirement, the constitutional minimum
that all plaintiffs must meet. Even under quasi-sovereign interest standing, states still
must show real interest of their own in the litigation,31 3 which the ACA plaintiff-
states did not.314 But I contend that they could have. The Virginia District Court, in
rejecting a ripeness challenge to the Commonwealth's claim, acknowledged that the
individual mandate does not take effect until 2014, but "that does not mean that its
effects will not be felt by the Commonwealth in the near future. 315 Judge Hudson
further observed that individuals, insurance companies, and employers have to take
steps to ensure that their current health plans comply with ACA or evaluate and
contract for insurance coverage in the near future.316 More to the point of state
standing, and "[m]ore importantly, the Commonwealth must revamp its health care
program to ensure compliance with the enactment's provisions, particularly with
respect to Medicaid. This process will entail more than simple fine tuning.
' ' 17
Further allegations, along the lines of the Medicaid bootstrap argument,
318
buttressed by description of particular planning efforts and budget compromises that
306 See supra Part 11 (discussing individual plaintiffs' factual allegations).
307 See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 998 n. 111 (citing scholarly commentary).
308 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522.309 Id. at 520 n.17.3 10 Id. at 519.
311 Id. at 520.
312 Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1005.
313 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).
314 See Vladeck, supra note 286, at 870 (asserting that "there is no federal statute or
constitutional provision that in any way creates or otherwise recognizes a distinct injury that Virginia
will suffer as a state as a result of the ACA's minimum essential coverage provision").
315 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 608 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev'd, 656
F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-
420).
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 See Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost that Slayed the Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REv. 55, 73-75 (2012)
(rejecting the Medicaid bootstrap argument for standing because any state injury is merely "indirect,"
arising by virtue of private citizens' reactions to the individual mandate by enrolling in Medicaid).
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states are currently undertaking in anticipation of the 2014 effective date319 should
be sufficient for Article III standing purposes. In overturning Judge Hudson's
decision on the Commonwealth's standing, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that
factors such as "a taxpayer's current possession of health insurance, current or
planned future consumption of health care, or related voluntary action" would
provide a sufficiently concrete factual context to support standing. 32 But the court
did not consider similar future regulation of and present-day planning, saving, and
action by the Commonwealth as providing "concrete adverseness" for state
standing.
321
The Commonwealth perhaps did not adequately allege, and the Fourth Circuit
certainly did not consider, similar future regulation of and present-day planning,
saving, and action as providing "concrete adverseness" for state standing. In addition
to the woodwork effects of Medicaid, Virginia and other states could have more
clearly alleged present-day injury in having to adjust state budgets to prepare to
implement Medicaid expansion and other changes compelled by the law, survey
state insurance laws for compliance with ACA, and decide whether to cooperate
with the federal government in establishing state-based health insurance exchanges
to facilitate the individual mandate. The point is that these ACA provisions operate
directly on states, requiring present-day fiscal and administrative preparation to
effectuate the individual mandate.
With respect to private plaintiffs, lower courts readily recognized their standing
to challenge the minimum essential coverage requirement that takes effect in 2014 as
long as they alleged some present-day financial impact or change in personal or
spending habits in anticipation of that date. States, it seems, could just as easily
allege concrete and particularized planning and budgetary impacts deriving from the
individual mandate. States have a real stake-arguably an even greater stake than
individuals-in resolving questions over the relative scope of federal and state
powers. 322 If the constitutional minimum requirements for standing can be trusted to
preserve the adversarial process and separation of powers in cases involving private
litigants, those limits should likewise suffice for cases involving state litigants.
319 See, e.g., DIANE JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: NEW OPTIONS FOR
MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL'Y,
(2010), available at http://www.nashp.org/sites/default/files/LTSSSCAN-FINAL-9-29-10.PDF
(observing that "[s]tates have significant roles in implementing practically all aspects of the
Affordable Care Act"); RACHEL MORGAN, THE 2011 STATE LEGISLATORS' CHECK LIST FOR HEALTH
REFORM IMPLEMENTATION, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2011), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/StateLegislatorsCheckdec20.pdf (detailing each provision of
ACA calling for state response, including many tied to the individual mandate).
320 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 272-73 (reversing district court's standing
decision).
321 Id. (citing Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 995 F.2d
510, 513 (4th Cir. 1993)).
322 See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2001) (arguing that process federalism does not
adequately protect states' interests and thus the federal courts must play an active role); Ernest A.
Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating
Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1815-44 (2005) (arguing that the federal courts have a
primary role to play in questions of federalism doctrine).
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V. CONCLUSION
The central issue in the ACA litigation is the constitutionality of the minimum
essential coverage requirement, better known as the individual mandate. Both
individuals, who will be subject to the requirement and associated sanctions for
noncompliance, and states, which play a central role in implementing the individual
mandate, challenge its constitutionality. Because individuals cannot assert plausible
due process objections to the requirement to purchase health insurance, they instead
argue that Congress has exceeded the scope of its enumerated powers by enacting
such a law. That issue, regarding the federal structure of government, is particularly
and directly salient to states. Lower courts readily recognized private plaintiffs'
standing to challenge the individual mandate on structural grounds but were less
willing to allow states to bring similar claims. This Article argues for states'
standing parity.
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APPENDIX A: CASES RECOGNIZING STANDING
Case Name Court Plaintiff ACA Provision Merits Decision
Challenged
Florida v. 11 th Cir. Individuals; Individual Unconstitutional
HHS Association Mandate
States Medicaid Constitutional
Thomas 6th Cir. Individuals; Individual Constitutional
More v. Association Mandate
Obama
Liberty 4th Cir. Individuals; Individual Barred by TAIA 3
Univ. v. Employer; Mandate; (No standing for
Geithner Public Employer public officials or
Officials; Responsibility physician)
Physician
Seven-Sky D.C. Cir. Individuals Individual Constitutional
v. Holder (including Mandate (Strong dissent on
Medicare- TAIA)
eligible)
Goudy- M.D. Pa. Individuals Individual Unconstitutional
Bachman v. Mandate
HHS
323 Federal Tax Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006) (providing that "no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any
person").
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APPENDIX B: CASES DENYING STANDING
Case Name Court Plaintiff ACA Provision Rationale for No
Challenged Standing
Virginia v. 4th Cir. State Individual No parens patriae
Sebelius Mandate standing
Baldwin v. 9th Cir. Individuals; Individual No injury-in-fact;
Sebelius Association; Mandate; employer too
Employers Employer small
Responsibility
New Jersey 3d Cir. Physician; Individual No injury-in-fact
Physicians Association; Mandate;
v. Obama Patient Employer
Responsibility
Pupura v. 3d Cir. Individuals Individual No injury-in-fact,
Sebelius Mandate even under
Bond 24
Bryant v. S.D. Public Individual No injury-in-fact
Holder Miss. Officials; Mandate to public official,
Individuals even under Bond
(Individuals'
amended
complaints
sufficed)
Kinder v. E.D. Mo. Public Individual No injury-in-fact;
Geithner Official; Mandate; no Tenth
Public Employer Amendment
Employer; Responsibility standing
Individuals
Shreeve v. E.D. 25,000 Individual No injury-in-fact
Obama Tenn. Entities and Mandate
Individuals
Bellow v. E.D. Tex Individual Individual No injury-in-fact
HHS Mandate
Peterson v. D.N.H. Individual Individual Medicare satisfies
United (Medicare Mandate mandate
States Recipient)
324 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (recognizing individual's standing to challenge
indictment under federal statute on Tenth Amendment grounds).
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